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One of the most frightening features of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union was the enormous number of nuclear weapons each side acquired. Table 1 lists the total 
number of stockpiled weapons belonging to both countries at five-year intervals from 1945 to 1995. 
Figure 1 presents the same data graphically1. 
Year us USSR 
1945 6 0 
1950 369 5 
1955 3057 200 
1960 20434 1605 
1965 31265 6129 
1970 25742 11643 
1975 26675 19443 
1980 23387 30062 
1985 22941 39197 
1990 20684 33515 
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Table 1- Stockpiled nuclear weapons 
What led these two countries to acquire so many weapons? American thinking can be 
explained fairly briefly. The United States developed nuclear weapons first and was the world's 
only nuclear state in the years immediately following World War II. Nuclear weapons had ended 
that war and were widely viewed as having saved enormous numbers of American lives by 
eliminating the need for a US invasion of Japan. Thus the nuclear arms race began with a belief on 
the US's part that nuclear weapons would make the US safer by preventing further wars. However, 
as hostility grew between the US and the Soviet Union in the late 40s and early 50s and as the 
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USSR developed nuclear weapons of its own, the US increasingly thought in terms of a possible 
military conflict with the Soviet Union. US decisions about numbers of weapons were based on 
"targeting doctrine," a systematic plan for selecting militarily significant targets in the Soviet Union 
for attack in case of a war. The fact that the US aimed at military and not civilian targets largely 
accounts for the rapid increase in numbers of weapons between the mid-50s and the mid-60s -there 
is always another airfield from which military planes could be launched or another factory that 
could support a war effort. 
By the late 50s, however, another factor entered the calculation. Based on ideas drawn in part 
from game theory, a branch of mathematics, Hermann Kahn and others shaped the notion of 
deterrence2• By the end of Robert McNamara's tenure of Secretary of Defense (1961-1968), 
deterrence, in the form known as MAD or mutually assured destruction, was well-established as the 
conceptual basis for US security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. That is, from the perspective of 
deterrence, parity between the US and the USSR and a secure second-strike capability for each side 
were seen as desirable since they would characterize a situation in which neither side would have an 
incentive to attack the other. Thus, since parity was desirable, there was no further reason at this 
time for the US to continue to increase its nuclear stockpile; in fact, the US stockpile declined in the 
late 60s. 
The Soviet Union, however, engaged in a very different analysis, one that was far more 
sophisticated mathematically. In order to understand thoroughly what the Soviets were doing and 
why, we need to take a brief historical excursion. 
Historical background 
The basis for Soviet Cold War thinking can be traced at least as far as ancient Greece. Aristotle 
saw human beings as possessing an intuition capable of discerning valid first principles about the 
world. He never explained where such an intuition might originate, but nevertheless, he held that it 
existed. Thus, from this perspective, deductive reasoning, such as is used in Euclid's Elements, 
yields absolutely certain truths about the world. Aristotle did not believe that the natural world was 
fundamentally mathematical in its structure. However, by the seventeenth century, belief in the 
scope of mathematical thinking had vastly expanded. For example, in 1623, Galileo wrote: 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which continually stands open to 
our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one learns to comprehend the 
language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of 
mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without 
which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one 
wanders about in a dark labyrinth. 3 
A generation later, Descartes envisioned a mechanical universe susceptible to mathematical 
analysis and proposed a method for analyzing it. Following him, Liebniz envisioned a rational, 
universal calculus that could be used to formulate and solve problems in all areas of human activity. 
In 1677, he wrote: 
All inquiries that depend on reason would be performed ... by a kind of calculus ... And if 
someone would doubt what I advanced I should say to him: Let us count, sir; and thus by 
taking pen and ink, we should soon settle the question. 4 
The foundations were being laid for a view of the world that saw it as rational, mechanical, and 
capable of being described by mathematics. But the main event that advanced this perspective was 
Isaac Newton's discovery of the laws of gravitation. His Principia de Mathematica was published 
116 
in 1687. In the Principia, Newton showed how mathematical ideas that could be very simply and 
briefly expressed (such as the inverse square law for gravitation) can account for planetary motion. 
That is, from the point of view of his contemporaries, Newton's mathematics had solved a problem 
that had puzzled the best minds for millennia, that of human beings' place in the universe. This 
work captured the imagination of his generation. By the mid-eighteenth century, "Enlightenment" 
scholars were convinced that all science and technical arts could be pursued by the same rational 
method. They promoted this view in their grand publication project the Encyclopedie. Many 
thinkers of this era were optimistic that comparable laws could be found for all dimensions of the 
natural world, including human society. That is, it would be possible to develop a rational science 
of society and a rational social order that would avoid war and greatly advance human well being. 
Starting in the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796), these ideas began to become popular 
among the Russian intelligentsia. By the late nineteenth century, they dominated intellectual life. 
Karl Marx' work on economics in the mid-nineteenth century was also built on this same 
foundation of belief in a rational, mechanical social order. He saw societies as embodying the law 
of class conflict and evolving toward an ultimate goal of a classless society. When he died in 1883, 
his most prominent disciple, Friedrich Engels began his eulogy of Marx with the words, "Just as 
Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of 
development of human history." Such ideas were widely circulated in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Russia and provided a fertile climate for the Communist Revolution of 1917, led 
by Vladimir Lenin. 
Soviet military thought 
Soviet society was a planned, centrally managed society based on the ideal of rational, 
scientific thought and the Marxist notion of the classless society. Military thought was 
similarly expected to be "scientifically based." Comments to this effect are frequent in Soviet 
military literature. This requirement is derived from Marxist-Leninist principles of scientific 
detenninism that essentially declare that all phenomena are governed by laws and that no 
phenomena occur outside of laws. Thus, if the laws that govern a situation can be fully 
understood and the situation itself fully described, the behaviors that will occur are predictable. 
Thu Soviet scholars invested a great deal of effort into attempts to understand these laws and 
decision-makers aimed to base their decisions on them as well. 
The Soviets believed they knew the laws of war. These laws were expressed by the Lanchester 
equations, first articulated by an English mathematician, F. W. Lanchester, in 1914. They were also 
discovered independently by a Russian mathematician, N. Osipov, in 1915. In their simplest form, 





- = -bx 
dt 
x and y denote the size of two opposing forces and a and b denote attrition rates occurring in battle. 
The ratio b/a is called the correlation of forces. This form of the equations assumes that each side's 
forces are completely homogeneous; that is, they are not made up of different components having 
differing capabilities and vulnerabilities. There is also a heterogeneous form of the Lanchester 
equations: 
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1 =-I,rijxi,j =1,2, ... ,n 
dt i=l 
In this form the xi's and yj's denote the size of each component of each side's forces and Bij (for 
instance) represents the attrition rate of Xi due to Yj· Expressions for the COP for this system of 
equations were developed as well. Note that "homogeneous" and "heterogeneous" are being used 
here to denote the structure of each side's forces not the form of the equation as is typically done in 
the theory of ordinary differential equations. Note also that these are deterministic equations; there 
are also stochastic versions. 
The Lanchester equations have been widely studied and are still the object of current research. 
However, for our purposes here, the simple form shown above will suffice. These equations are 




a(l- y~) = b(x2 -x~) 
Consider an example. Suppose two opponents begin with equal size forces. For simplicity 
let's set this common value to 100. If the two sides engage in battle, we can graph their attrition of 
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Figure 2 - Attrition of forces as determined by the Lanchester Equations 
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Note that a favorable correlation of forces gives a side an enormous advantage. For example, if 
COF = 0.5, the y forces can annihilate the x forces with less than a 30% loss. IF COF = 0.33, they 
can annihilate the x forces with a loss of less than 20%. In practice, adversaries rarely fight until 
one side is annihilated. Suppose the y side has the advantage and the x side surrenders when it loses 
15% of its force. If COF = 0.5, the y side still retains 92.8% of its force; if COF = 0.33, it retains 
95.3%. 
Uses of the correlation of forces 
Because the Lanchester equations were seen as the laws of war, the concept of the correlation 
of forces obtained enormous credibility as a measure of the effectiveness of the Soviet forces. 
Many formulae were developed for computing it in various situations; some even attempted to 
include intangible factors such as esprit de corps and strategy. When weapons and equipment as 
well as personnel were incorporated in its computation, it was called the correlation of forces and 
means (COFM). The 1979 version of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia gave a non-technical 
definition of the COFM that shows how much the Soviets regarded it as a factor in a natural law: 
[The COFM is] an objective indicator of the fighting power of opposing sides, which 
permits a determination of the degree of superiority of one of them over the other. The 
correlation of forces and means is determined by a comparison of existing data on the 
quantitative and qualitative descriptions of subunits, units, combined units and armaments 
of one's own forces and those of the enemy. 
L. Ya. Shepislov developed one pair of formulae for computing the COF in 1981. The first 
formula applied to forces of the same type: 5 
For example, Ni could denote the numbers of different types of tanks on one side and Pi a measure 
of their relative effectiveness. The Pi's were very carefully computed - one type of tank was 
selected as a standard. Its rate of fire and the size of shells it used were consolidated into a 
composite measure of its firepower. Similar calculations were made for each type of tank on both 
sides; by comparing to the standard, measures of relative effectiveness were made for all of the 
tanks on both sides. Analogous calculations were made for all weapons systems. 
The second formula applied to adversarial systems: 
For instance, the Ni could denote different numbers of various types of tanks and the Mj 
numbers of various anti-tank weapons. Bi and Dj are effectiveness coefficients of each type of 
weapon (based on firing rate, etc.) The Kij are counter-effectiveness coefficients of each type of 
tank versus each type of anti-tank weapon (and the reverse for the Lji.) Ultimately, all of the COP 
119 
values were consolidated into a single measure of the effectiveness of an entire army. However, 
this final formula is not available in the West at this time, to my knowledge. 
The Soviets also developed formulae for assessing the relative strength of their nuclear forces. 
Major General I.I. Anureyev developed the following formula in 19676: 
The Q's denote the total equivalent megatonnage of each side and the u's the fractions of that 
megatonnage in each weapon. Thus the part of the formula involving the Q's and the u's represent 
the relative destructive power of the nuclear weapons possessed by each side. The v's denote each 
side's probability of penetrating the enemies defenses and the ro's denote the proportion of its 
weapons not destroyed on the ground. 
Now let's examine how the Soviets used the COF. Table 2 is an English translation of a page 
from a Soviet military commander's handbook7• 
CORRELATION OF FORCES AND :MEANS 
IN THE DIRECTION OF MAIN ATTACK 
IN THE DEPTH OF IMMEDIATE MISSION 
ENEMY CORRE- OWN FORCES 
LATION 
FORCES & :MEANS TOTAL PERKM QUANTI- FORCES & MEANS TOTAL PERKM 
OF FRONT TATIVE OF FRONT 
MECHBNS MECHBNS 
MEDIUM TANKS MEDIUM TANKS 
LIGHT TANKS LIGHT TANKS 
IFC IFC 
APC APC 
ARTY & MORTAR ARTY & MORTAR 
DESTRUCTION OF DESTRUCTION OF 
ARTYPERUOF ARTY PER UOF 
ATOMs ATOMs 
TOTAL DAMAGE TOTAL DAMAGE 
TANKS TANKS 
AIR DEFENSE AIR DEFENSE 
SAMSGUNS SAMSGUNS 




Table 2 - Excerpt from Soviet commander's handbook 
Soviet commanders were trained to use this table and others like it as battle management tools. 
They would fill in the size of each side's forces and compute the numbers per kilometer of front. 
They would then write in the COF for each category in the middle column and use this information 
in formulating their battle plan and managing their forces as a battle proceeded. 
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The COF became the principal basis for Soviet "scientific decision-making" regarding the 
composition and employment of their military forces. It was used as an aid in peacetime strategic 
planning to determine Soviet force deficiencies and in arms control negotiations, as well as in 
evaluating options during combat and in predicting the probable outcome of combat and rates of 
advance of forces. 
Conclusions 
In spite of all of this careful planning and analysis, the Soviet Union lost the Cold War. What 
happened? Were the Soviets wrong about the laws of war? Was their mathematics defective? 
Probably neither. Most analysts today do not regard the Lanchester equations as laws in the precise 
sense of Newton's laws of gravitation. However, as an approximation they are helpful. For 
instance, if the COF is decidedly on one side's favor in a battle, that side will probably win, 
regardless of the stochastic factors. Furthermore, the Soviet's mathematical analyses of the 
equations were sound. The problem was that the Lanchester equations describe the evolution of a 
battle, but the US and the USSR did not fight a hot war. Rather, the Soviet Union broke up and its 
Communist government lost power. That is, the Soviet Union collapsed because of political, social, 
and economic factors that had nothing to do with the COF - the Soviets had made their decisions in 
preparation for a battle that never came. 
Nevertheless, the story of the COF and its role in Russian history illustrate some important 
truths about mathematics. First, the influence of mathematics on culture is not always visible, but it 
can be very powerful. The COF is a concrete example of how a specific mathematical model 
influenced major decisions in one particular setting. More generally, the COF is a concrete example 
of how the Enlightenment framework discussed near the beginning of this paper has shaped 
Western culture for over 300 years. Much of it originated in mathematics. A major priority of the 
current US administration is rethinking the concepts of deterrence and stability for a post-Cold War 
world. These concepts are at least quasi-mathematical, so the relationship between mathematics 
and policy remains important today. 
Secondly, the application of mathematics always occurs in a larger context that involves many 
non-mathematical factors. In this case, this context includes an entire social philosophy (Marxism) 
as well as the broader world political, economic, and military context. A user of mathematics in 
such situations will be much more effective if he or she is well acquainted with the non-
mathematical factors. 
Thirdly, mathematical models may look objective but they may obscure major presuppositions. 
In this case, the notions that the world is rational, material, and mechanical and that there exist 
natural laws for human individual and social behavior are implicit in Soviet applications of the 
COF. Yet the Lanchester equations by themselves give no clue to the existence of this larger 
framework in which they are being used. 
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